

Marine

Dynamic Positioning - Assurance and station keeping

BA-MAR-004

Purpose: Completed where the vessel works on dynamic positioning, to verify that the redundancy the operation relies on is real, proven and understood by the people on watch.

Frequency: Once per campaign and after any DP incident | **Applies to:** Marine | **Response set:** Yes / Partial / No / N/A, with a note and evidence against each item

Basis: publicly available industry guidance, principally IMCA and IOGP. This framework does not replace the diving contractor's safety management system, the client's own risk assessment, or applicable national legislation. | **Complete online at** barrierassurance.com

#	Question	Guidance and reference	Y / P / N / NA
1	Is the DP FMEA current, and has it been proven by trial rather than by document review alone?	The FMEA is a claim about what happens when something fails. The trial is the evidence. Check both exist and agree. Ref: IMCA M166 (FMEA code of practice); IMCA M247 (DP system components and failure modes)	
2	Have the annual DP trials been completed within period, and are the findings closed?	Check the date and the findings list. Trials overdue on a DP2 vessel is a stop-work matter, not an observation. Ref: IMCA M190 (DP annual trials programmes)	
3	Is the activity specific operating guidance available for the intended work?	The critical activity mode and the task appropriate mode should be defined for this task, not in general terms. Ref: IMCA M103; IMCA M220	
4	Are the DP key personnel certificated and experienced for this class of vessel and operation?	Certification alone is not experience. Check time on this vessel type and this kind of task. Ref: IMCA M117 (training and experience of key DP personnel); IMCA M249	
5	Have DP capability plots been reviewed against the expected environmental conditions?	Confirm the plots cover the worst case direction and the intact and post-failure conditions. Ref: IMCA M140 (DP capability plots); IMCA M103	
6	Are position reference systems adequate in number, independent and appropriate to the location?	Look for genuine independence rather than three inputs from a common source. Ref: IMCA M252; IMCA M242; IMCA M244	
7	Has the DP watch handover procedure been followed, with the setup verified at each change?	Handover is where station keeping events cluster. Verify by observation. Ref: IMCA M103; IMCA M117	
8	Are DP alert states and the associated actions understood by the bridge team and by the worksite?	The diver or the crane driver needs to know what green, yellow and red mean for them, not only the DPO. Ref: IMCA M103; IMCA M205	
9	Have any station keeping events been reported, investigated and shared?	Under-reporting is the norm in this area, so ask about events that did not become incidents. Ref: IMCA DPSI series; IMCA M181	
10	Is the vessel operating within any shallow water or environmental constraint that affects DP performance?	Shallow water, strong current and thruster interaction change the redundancy picture materially. Ref: IMCA M263 (shallow water DP operations); IMCA M260	
11	Have consequence analysis and redundancy settings been confirmed as appropriate for the work?	Confirm the settings match the operation being carried out rather than a default from a previous job. Ref: IMCA M103; IMCA M225	